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The performance of amateur traders on a public Internet site: A 
case of a stock-exchange contest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
We analyze a very thorough data base, including all of the bid/ask orders and daily portfolio values of 
more than 600 on-line amateur traders from February 2007 to June 2009. These traders were taking 
part in a stock-exchange contest proposed by the French Internet stock-exchange site Zonebourse. 
More than 80% of traders lose relative to the market. Their relative average annual performance varies 
from -38% to -60%, depending on the method used. In absolute, more than 99% of traders lose and 
face drastic losses: on average, portfolio values fall from an initial value of 100 to a terminal value of 
7 in the 29 months covered here. When we include the rewards offered by the contest, average 
performance becomes -13% a year. However, only two deciles continue to beat the market. From an 
initial value of 100 the final value is 28 including rewards, but 95% of traders still lose in absolute. 
There is no clear performance persistence for traders. Are the best traders just lucky then? Focusing on 
contest winners, the long-term transition analysis suggests a long-term probability of staying in the 
best decile which is greater than chance. We thus cannot reject a “star effect” of staying in the best 
decile. However, the great majority of amateurs do seem to be e-pigeons. Online trading may just be 
costly entertainment, like casino gambling. 
 
 
 
2 
 
In this paper, we analyze a very thorough data base, including all of the bid/ask orders and 
daily portfolio values of more than 600 on-line amateur traders. These traders were taking part in a 
stock-exchange contest proposed by the French Internet stock-exchange site Zonebourse. These data 
are available from February 2007 to June 2009, so that the period under consideration covers the 
2007-2008 subprime crisis. The behavior and performances of amateur traders on the internet is of 
considerable interest. In January 2010, amateurs carried out more than one million orders on the 
Parisian market and held more than one million client accounts. On-line trading accounted for 11%
1
 of 
orders passed on the Paris exchange. The behavior of amateurs may have serious consequences for 
equilibrium in the financial market, particularly if they are “irrational”.  
 
Both professionals and academics are interested in these behaviors. The first consider the 
possibility of being able to “money pump”2 such irrational or badly-informed agents; the latter analyze 
the economic performance and behavioral biases of amateurs per se. 
 
The performance of amateurs can reveal whether trading is really a job or not. If so, it requires 
specific skills or experience. Professionals would then be expected to have better performances than 
amateurs; not only because they are better informed or lucky, but also because they are less inclined 
than amateurs to succumb to behavioral biases. In the context of trading, these biases have been well-
described in previous work in behavioral finance: the momentum bias (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), 
the disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985), overconfidence (Alpert and Raiffa, 1982), 
insufficient diversification, casino gambling behavior, and so on. 
 
With respect to the skill effect, Mizrach and Weerts (2009) showed, in their work on amateur 
traders, that experience matters: traders who have been present on the market longer enjoy better 
results. They interpret their results in terms of a “learning by trading effect”. 
                                                          
1
 The market share of brokers who are on-line members of ACSEL, the French association of digital economics. 
2
 See Cubitt and Sugden (2001) for a discussion of money pumps, Dutch booking, and deviations from standard 
consistency assumptions. 
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These behavioral biases can be exacerbated by trading on-line, since the latter accelerates the 
speed of reaction of those who trade from home, and can lead individual investors to carry out too 
many transactions. Barber and Odean (2000, 2002) and Odean (1999) have shown that investors who 
are overconfident carry out too many transactions, and that by doing so they reduce their expected 
profits. The beginning of online trading, at the end of the 1990s, has clearly boosted the number of 
orders (Choi, Laibson, Metrick, 2002), but led to a fall in trader profitability (Barber and Odean, 
2002).  
Last but not least, our database provides heuristic materials in a real market situation where 
the contest situation (traders can win significant prizes of up to 10000 Euros) is associated with 
relatively (to agents’ total wealth) small initial outlays. Traders thus have incentives to take 
undiversified risks, bet on few assets, and have high leverage, in order to win the prizes. Even if they 
often lose ex post, the expected ex ante reward encourages risk taking. Dom and Sengmueller (2009) 
have already argued that online trading can be considered as entertainment, and Anderson (2006) 
considers online trading as casino gambling, where the great majority loses and a few win. Our contest 
situation may exacerbate this gambling aspect.  
 
In this paper, we analyze the performance of these amateur traders and then focus on the 
persistence in performance to identify an eventual skill effect. As previously suggested, amateurism, 
the speed of transactions and the contest situation should lead to drastic losses for our amateurs. We 
will see whether our data vindicate this pessimistic prediction. Are online traders really just e-pigeons 
(Blanchard, 2000)? Moreover, is there a skill effect for the best traders (persistence) or are they just 
lucky? 
 
The first section below presents our database, the contest, the Parisian stock market and 
descriptive statistics. We then examine the distribution of trader performances, the timing of these 
performances, and their distribution by age and gender. Section 3 then examines the persistence of 
performance over time. Last, Section 4 concludes. 
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1) DESCRIPTION OF THE DATABASE AND THE CONTEST 
1.1) The Contest 
Zonebourse is a stock exchange Internet site which has since February 2007 proposed two 
trading contests each month. Participants can take part in the first, a stock contest, by trading an 
authorized list of 281 stocks (close to the SBF250) with a maximum leverage effect of 3.  Participants 
can also compete in a second, Warrant, contest. Since January 2009, only the Warrants emitted by 
Commerzbank, which is Zonebourse’s partner, are permitted in the contest. Previously, the investors 
had to hold at least one Commerzbank Warrant. 20,000 Euros are paid out each month for each 
contest. 
 
Table 1: Monthly Prizes 
Monthly ranking Stock contest rewards (€) Warrant contest rewards(€) 
1
st
 10000 10000 
2
nd
  4000 4000 
3
rd
 2000 2000 
4
th
 800 800 
5
th
 700 700 
6
th
 -10
th
  500 500 
 
The minimum initial investment is only 1000 Euros, so the contest is very attractive. In return, 
each investor accepts the total transparency of their operations which are freely available on-line for 
both other participants and visitors to the site. Zonebourse is associated with the on-line broker 
“Bourse Direct” for stock trading and with Commerzbank for their Warrants.  
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Each candidate can also announce their transactions and comments on a public blog. A 
window continuously provides the top/flop daily performances amongst contest participants in terms 
of Euros won or lost, as well as their monthly and annual results.
3
 
 
Table 2: The public window of Daily and Monthly performances 
Shares 
 
Perf. % day Participants Perf. day € Rank 
 
+40.0% Jetpiza  +263 € 4 (72) 
 
 
+38.6% Evildap +366 € 3 (42) 
 
 
+32.4% Newbie64 +500 € 54 (108) 
 
 
-32.1% The xav  -275 € 133 (124) 
 
 
-18.9% Watatcho -1399 € 123 (90) 
 
 
-13.5% Flakettt42 -158 € 131 (118) 
 
 
 
Warrants 
 
Perf. % day Participants Perf. day € Rank 
 
+29.5% Popolili  +97 € 30 (45) 
 
 
+24.1% camelia  +567 € 8 (23) 
 
 
+23.8% Traderpack +105 € 39 (46) 
 
 
-26.1% Parisien  -259 € 52 (43) 
 
 
-23.1% Echo13  -400 € 47 (38) 
 
 
-21.3% Tonio86  -205 € 44 (34) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 The monthly and annual results in the window actually need to be recalculated in order to take into account 
contributions and withdrawals. 
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Classification - 12 months  Participants classified: 762 - Updated 12/10 
 
Rank 
 
Participants Perf. 12 months % Capital Perf. % day 
      
1 (110)  Thefwp  +1,028.6% 4 153 € 0.0% 
2 ( - )  Isa000  +449.3% 741 € 0.0% 
3 (8)  Jacaas +401.0% 19 038 € +2.3% 
4 (115)  Smam77 +375.1% 971 € -5.7% 
5 (20)  Manneke  +283.0% 7 661 € 0.0% 
6 (1)  Tofparis  +260.4% 7 249 € -0.2% 
7 (125)  Grindavik  +213.2% 2 116 € 0.0% 
8 (39)  Snorky222 +196.0% 12 310 € +1.6% 
9 ( - )  Abdess +187.6% 2 876 € +5.4% 
10 (38)  Krylin  +167.0% 7 536 € +6.9% 
 
 
Moreover, participants' orders (and their results) are permanently posted in a window on the main 
page.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
Table 3: Public window of orders  
Date 
 
Operation Rank  
     
13/10 | 
17:29 
 
Ginkgo: purchase order for THOMSON 82 (102) 
 
 
13/10 | 
17:26 
 
Ginkgo: closes their position on ALCATEL LUCENT 82 (102) 
 
 
13/10 | 
17:25 
 
Jmt454: purchase order for KAUFMAN AND BROAD 13 (7) 
 
 
13/10 | 
17:24 
 
Miss daisy: purchase order for WCSOCGE 52,13 1209 
  
13/10 | 
17:24 
 
Random: purchase order for WCSOCGE 52,13 1209 2 (3) 
 
 
13/10 | 
17:19 
 
Bevi: purchase order for VALLOUREC 56 ( - ) 
 
 
 
1.2) Paris Stock Exchange SRD (Delayed Payment Service) 
The participants in the stock contest can benefit from the SRD (Delayed Payment Service). 
The SRD constitutes a distinctive feature of the Parisian Stock Exchange. For a certain number of 
securities published by Euronext Paris (Paris Bourse), it is possible not to settle the operation 
(payment for the purchases, cashing of sales) until the end of the stock-exchange month (the 
liquidation day). This costs an interest rate or a broker fee, which is paid to the financial intermediary. 
This SRD is a relic of monthly payment that was abandoned in September 2000. SBF 250 securities 
obligatorily have high capitalization (1 billion Euros) and a transaction volume of at least one million 
Euros. Cash payment remains the rule in the Paris stock exchange. SBF operations should thus be 
specified ex ante, when the order is placed.  
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The SRD makes it possible to benefit from leverage. The contest rules limit this leverage to a 
value of 3, which is lower than the level authorized by Euronext (5).  
 
Moreover, the SRD also makes it possible to bet on the future price of a stock, and to take 
long or short positions with overdrafts. It is in fact possible to balance these positions only at the end 
of the stock-exchange month. The SRD thus permits participants to open short positions and to obtain 
leverage while trading on stocks, without being obliged to trade with derivatives (options, warrants or 
futures).  
 
1.3) Data Files 
The data we analyze, provided by Zonebourse, are the same as the public data, but collected 
on 5 Excel files. The data begin on February 14
th
 2007 and run to June 16
th
 2009 (26 months). The five 
files are as follows.  
 
- A Participants file with pseudo and numerical identifiers of the contest participants. 
- A Flows file with contributions and withdrawals of currency, and contributions and withdrawals of 
securities, for each participant and each day. 
- An Orders file. These are conditional or firm. 
- A Transactions file. This contains the hour, date and price of entry and exit, and quantities. 
- A Portfolio Value file. This identifies the value of the portfolio of each participant each day, profits 
and losses on the SRD, the value of stocks, cash, contributions and withdrawals. 
 
All files were cleaned of errors. They were also cleaned of fictive negative portfolio values 
resulting from the bad recording of the date of contributions. 
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1.4) Participants 
Each participant (and their operations) who were registered at least once in one of the two 
contests are included in the data base. Participants remain in the base even when they cannot (or do not 
want to) take part in the contest any longer (having a portfolio value under 1000 Euros, the use of 
Warrants other than those emitted by Commerzbank etc.). This explains the considerable gap between 
traders who are in the base and those who are present in any given month in the contest. The “stock” 
of traders is generally four times larger than the number of active traders.  
 
 
Note that the 2008 financial crisis did not affect the net inflow of traders. 688 traders were 
active during this period, and have their operations recorded in the data base. At the 06/16/2009 
closing date, 586 traders were still active. In May 2009, gender was recorded for 656 of the 659 
traders, and is distributed as follows: 
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Figure 1: Participants: Inflows and Outflows 
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Table 4: Gender of participants 
Gender Population Percentage 
Women 82 14.3 
Men 574 85.7 
 
The age distribution for the 561 traders with available information is shown in Table 5 (average age = 
41). 
Table 5: Age of participants 
Age Age< 25 25≤age< 30 30≤age< 35 35≤age< 40 40≤age< 45 
Population 
- men 
- women 
32 
27 
5 
56 
48 
8 
93 
87 
6 
101 
88 
13 
89 
76 
13 
Percentage 5.7% 9.98% 16.57% 18% 15.8% 
Age 45≤age< 50 50≤age< 55 55≤age< 60 60≤age< 65 65≤age 
Number 
- men 
- women 
71 
61 
10 
44 
40 
4 
31 
26 
5 
24 
24 
0 
20 
15 
5 
Percentage 12.65% 7.84% 5.52% 4.27% 3.56% 
 
1.5) Contest Winners  
During the period under consideration, 459 rewards were distributed amongst 218 traders. The 
reward ratio is the value of the reward divided by the value of the portfolio. The last column of Table 6 
shows that rewards double the portfolio value of winners on average.  
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Table 6: Number and value of rewards for winners: 
 Number of rewards   Portfolio value Value of rewards Reward ratio   
Mean 2.11 2370.12 1746.50 0.99 
Std deviation 1.66 2458.51 2211.61 1.42 
 
Figure 2: Amount of rewards won (Y-Axis) by winners (X-Axis) 
 
The distribution of rewards is concentrated since only 116 winning traders win more than 
1000 Euros. Nevertheless, 40 winners win at least 10000 Euros. 
Figure 3: Population of winners (Y-Axis) ranked by number of times won (X-Axis) 
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2) PERFORMANCES 
2.1) The portfolio-value file 
An extract of the basic portfolio-value file is reproduced below. We have added our 
calculation of the gains and performances per day per trader to the original file (See Section 2.2 for 
details of these calculations).  
Table 7: Portfolio-value file 
Participant Date 
SRD NET 
value 
Stocks 
DEPOSIT Cash 
Portfolio 
value 
Contribution
(Assets) 
Cash 
contributions Total cont. Gain 
Day 
Return 
176 02/27/2007 27.5 0 1000 1027.5 0 0 0 27.5 0.0275 
176 02/28/2007 9.56 0 1952 1961.56 0 952 952 -17.94 -0.0119 
176 03/01/2007 9.56 0 1929 1938.56 0 -23 -23 0 0.0000 
176 03/02/2007 1.56 0 1929 1930.56 0 0 0 -8 -0.0041 
176 03/05/2007 46.46 0 9929 9975.46 0 8000 8000 44.9 0.0076 
176 03/06/2007 -133.41 3908.5 5979.59 9754.68 0 0 0 -220.78 -0.0221 
176 03/07/2007 -146.85 3918 5979.59 9750.74 0 0 0 -3.94 -0.0004 
176 03/08/2007 -208.95 4012 5979.59 9782.64 0 0 0 31.9 0.0033 
176 03/09/2007 -229.65 0 9987.12 9757.47 0 0 0 -25.17 -0.0026 
176 03/12/2007 -168.45 0 9987.12 9818.67 0 0 0 61.2 0.0063 
176 03/13/2007 -194.55 0 9987.12 9792.57 0 0 0 -26.1 -0.0027 
176 03/14/2007 -110.55 0 9987.12 9876.57 0 0 0 84 0.0086 
 
Positions are open for an average of four days. The median position duration is 0.7 days, and 
75% of positions are open for less than three days. Day traders are hence frequently observed in the 
contest. 73% of positions are long and 27% are short, and 70% of positions are open on the SRD. The 
median portfolio value is 1700€. However, the portfolio value when positions are held is 4702€ while 
the initial portfolio value was 3184€. Positions are taken by traders who enter the contest by investing 
more than the minimum required (1000€) and who have high portfolio values. Leverage is high in this 
data. We calculate this simply as the ratio of the transaction amount to portfolio value the day before 
the transaction. Absolute mean leverage is 1.79. 
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2.2) The calculation of performance 
We now want to calculate the performance rate from the portfolio-value data file. These 
performances are net of transaction fees, which are recorded as negative contributions. This 
transaction fee is 0.12% of the transaction amount, with a minimum of 8.97€ per order and 17.94€ for 
a round trip. The average round trip is 24.50€ for an average transaction of 1265€, so that fees 
represent around 2% of the total transaction amount.  
 
Performances are calculated from the change in portfolio value, i.e. the sum of the cash, SRD 
portfolio and stock portfolio values. We adjust these values for contributions and withdrawals in order 
to obtain the daily net performance of a trader's portfolio. The time of day (opening/closing) when 
contributions and withdrawals are recorded will be important for this calculation. 
 
 Following standard portfolio-performance measurement, as in Christopherson, Cariño and 
Ferson (2009), we then apply the Dietz (1968) midpoint formula to the daily data: 
 , where v are dated portfolio values in t and t-1, and the α's are the net 
contributions of cash (c) or assets (a) (SRD and stocks).  
 
This calculation yields the daily performance, and the cumulated daily values produce the 
adjusted values of traders’ portfolios for each day. Performance over a period (week, month or year) is 
then simply the ratio of the adjusted closing portfolio value to the adjusted opening value. 
 
2.3) The mean of idiosyncratic annualized performances 
Traders are present for varying periods of time. To compare results across individuals, we thus 
require a mean annualized performance rate. For traders who were active for less than one year, this 
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assumes that profitability can be extrapolated to a whole year. In some cases of very good results, this 
led to disproportionately high extrapolated figures.  For example, a trader who multiplied her capital 
by a factor of 10 in a little over 2 months is allotted an imputed annual performance of over 6000 
times her start-up capital. These kinds of extreme values are eliminated (by dropping the first and last 
percentile of results) as they introduce too much skew in mean performance. 
 
Annualized output is calculated from the daily outputs cumulated over the duration of trading 
activity,
,
 which is then extrapolated, .   
Following financial tradition, annualized relative outputs are the difference between the trader's 
annualized output and that of the market (SBF250)): R-Rm. This is what we simply call performance 
below. Hence, if the market records positive returns while the trader's are negative, relative 
performances strictly below -1 can result. This can be interpreted as both an effective loss and an 
opportunity loss from not having strictly followed the SBF250 market. 
 
Traders' results are much worse than that of the SBF 250, with amateurs having an average 
annual performance of -38%. The considerable variance in the results and the concentration of losses 
underline the usefulness of percentile indicators. 
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Table 8: Annualized idiosyncratic performances statistics (method 1) 
 
Duration 
(days) 
Start-up 
capital 
Contributions 
Performance 
% 
Average 482.67 2628.93 6946.77 -38 
St. Dev. 261.23 4601.18 19344.13 66 
Min 12.00 300.00 600.00 -184 
Max 853.00 50000.00 331500.00 654 
Quantiles     
0.05 77.00 1000.00 1000.00 -105 
0.1 125.30 1000.00 1000.00 -90 
0.25 244.25 1000.00 1500.00 -71 
0.5 473.50 1125.00 2650.00 -52 
0.75 753.00 2000.00 6000.00 -13 
0.8 790.00 2500.00 7500.00 -2 
0.9 825.00 5000.00 13000.00 21 
0.95 839.00 10000.00 21931.50 35 
 
Only the top two deciles of traders beat the market. Note that the annualized performance of 
the SBF 250 is -20.9%. The average annualized performance of traders is thus around -59%. These 
results are robust to eliminating the traders who are present for less than 6 months. The share of 
relative winners is close to that in previous work such as Anderson (2006), where only a quarter of 
investors enjoy positive gains. However, Anderson (2006) considers annualized gains relative to 
wealth in a market period that was more favorable. Losses are therefore less drastic than those here, 
but the shape of the cumulative frequency distributions of results
4
 is remarkably similar to ours. 
 
                                                          
4
 Anderson (2006), p. 35. 
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We have 17 Traders (and another 6 in the eliminated first percentile) who are “stars”, beating 
the market by more than 100% annualized. Around 5% (6% with the top percentile) beat the market by 
over 35%. 
 
At the other end of the distribution 10% (11% with the bottom percentile) lose more than 90% 
annualized relative to the market. Note that over 5% lose more than 100% of their wealth, which is 
possible using the Dietz formula. 
 
The empirical distribution of performance fits a Loglogistic (-2.6523; 2.1889; 8.2572) function 
(see Figure 4), with 90% of observations lying between -1.05 and 0.34 versus 86% for the theoretical 
distribution. We can also fit the data to a normal (-0.39; 0.60318) function. The distribution is 
leptokurtic with positive skewness (see Table 9). The Loglogistic distribution is also known as a Fisk 
distribution. Fisk (1961) showed that this distribution is the best fit for income distributions, with 
positive skewness and a “thin” distribution.  
 
Figure 4: The empirical distribution and the Loglogistic distribution 
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Table 9: The fit of the empirical distribution to classic distribution laws  
Fit LogLogistic Pearson5 Logistic InvGauss ExtValue Gamma Normal Weibull Exponential
Chi-Squared Test
151.7161 189.4196 201.5331 213.9495 227.2744 233.0284 377.4069 410.9464 1120.9527
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Anderson-Darling Test
5.0386 10.4695 8.8639 12.3016 12.7125 13.5124 +Infinity 33.1339 130.3294
N/A N/A <0.005 N/A <0.01 N/A <0.005 N/A <0.01
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
0.0892 0.1215 0.1046 0.1246 0.1281 0.1274 0.1446 0.1948 0.3912
N/A N/A <0.01 N/A <0.01 N/A <0.01 N/A <0.01  
Table 10: Empirical distribution statistics compared to those from Loglogistic and Normal 
distributions 
Fit Function Input Loglogistic(-2.5329;2.0698;7.7062) Normal(-0.37907;0.66262)
Distribution Statistics
Minimum -1.8396 -2.5329 -Infinity
Maximum 6.5427 +Infinity +Infinity
Mean -0.3791 -0.4046 -0.3791
Mode -0.7328 (est) -0.532 -0.3791
Median -0.5197 -0.4631 -0.3791
Std. Deviation 0.6626 0.5185 0.6636
Skewness 4.1561 1.2843 0
Kurtosis 37.6833 8.8081 3  
Performances including rewards 
Including rewards yields higher average performance figures (after eliminating extreme 
percentiles) of -13%. However, again only two deciles beat the market (performance is below 5% for 
the bottom 8 deciles). Better performances are found for the top decile (31%) and the top 5% (128%).  
 
2.4) Performance statistics with random investment  
We have above compared trader performance to that of the market. However, traders are not 
all present or active over the same periods. This heuristic difficulty can be treated via a random 
investment model, in which each day traders are randomly drawn using a standard Monte Carlo 
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method. A random performance path over the period is then computed. For each set of dated draws, 
we obtain a random investment performance over the period. With an initial portfolio value of 100 we 
can calculate the value of the portfolio at the end of the period for a given path of random draws. 
These Monte Carlo draws are repeated one million times: the resulting statistics appear in Table 11.  
 
   Table 11: Final portfolio distribution with random investment 
Quantile Market Mean 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 97.5% 99% 99.9% 
Final Portfolio 
(Starting value=100) 
55.73 6.84 0.42 1.55 5.27 14.94 27.55 44.47 88.84 260.47 
 
Random investment leads to quasi-ruin for at least 75% of the randomly-drawn paths. 
           Figure 5: Performance paths by quartiles 
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This figure shows that the results are far from brilliant even if the investor is very lucky and draws 
each day the first decile or percentile of the best traders. 
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Figure 6: Performance paths for the top decile 
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The top 0.1 percentile of final portfolio experience good gains, but doing so means that the 
individual has to draw the 0.1 top percentile result every day. Random investment thus leads to 
drastically bad results; we have to admit that the performance of our sample is very disappointing, and 
is worse than that found in the previous literature on internet amateurs, (Barber and Odean, 2000, and 
Mizrach and Weertz, 2009). However, our period is not the same (covering the 2008 financial crisis) 
and our contest situation may well also exacerbate losses. 
 
Random performance with rewards 
The mean final value is significantly higher, 28.3, than that without rewards. This reflects 
some good performances from the best winner traders, but, clearly, gains are not so good for the 
majority of traders. Even with rewards, 95% of traders still record losses. 
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Figure 7: The distribution (Y-axis) of portfolio final values with/without rewards (X-axis) 
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2.5) Periodic analysis: monthly performance rates  
It can be argued that these bad results reflect the 2008 financial crisis, i.e. a strong bearish 
stock market. However, our period also covers some bullish moments. To test the effect of market 
period on the amateur traders’ results we carry out a historical analysis: we compute the mean monthly 
performance of traders and compare this to that of the market. Figure 8 shows that traders' monthly 
performances are always worse than that of the market: their losses are amplified, and their gains are 
smaller. 
           Figure 8: Monthly results of traders vs the Market without inactive traders 
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We restrict the analysis here to active traders, since there is clearly a link between the 
probability that traders beat the market in a given month (R>Rm) and the share of inactive traders. In a 
Bear market period, one good way to outperform the market is to do nothing and to hold the entire 
portfolio in cash. As in the famous analysis in Barber and Odean (2000), trading appears hazardous to 
one's wealth. 
 
2.6) Performances by gender and age 
In order to compare the performances of different types of traders, we look at the weekly 
performance of current traders by category. Overall performance by category is obtained by 
cumulating these weekly average performance figures. Total performance is then the performance of 
an abstract representative trader who each week earns the average of all traders. Performances by 
gender (Table 12) and age (Table 13), and in total (without extreme value biases) can be calculated. 
 
For a start-up portfolio value of 100, the representative trader ends up with a portfolio value of 
only 7.15 at the end of the period. During this period, the market (SBF250) fell from 100 to 57.7. 
Average annualized performance is then -67.5% (traders) versus -20.9% (market); the relative annual 
performance is thus -46.6%. 
 
Table 12 shows that women have better scores than men, although the difference is not 
significant (one-tailed t-test p-value=0.25). We thus differ from Barber and Odean 2001(2), where 
boys exhibit better performances than do girls. 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
Table 12: Performance by gender 
Gender Final Portfolio (Start up=100) Average annualized perf.% 
Women 9.34 -63.5 
Men 6.89 -68 
All traders 7.15 -67.5 
SBF250 57.71 -20.9 
 
By age, the best performances are found amongst both younger (under 25) and older (over 65) 
traders. Note that there are relatively few traders in these age classes (see Table 4). Older traders 
perform significantly better than those aged 60-65 (one-tailed t-test p-value=0.028). Younger traders 
do better than those aged 25-30, but not significantly so (one-tailed t-test p-value=0.1). 
 
Table 13: Performance by age 
Age Final Portfolio (Start up=100) Average annualized perf.% 
<25 14.27 
 
-56.3 
25-30 6.27 -69.2 
 
30-35 6.02 -69.8 
- 
35-40 4.5 -73.3 
40-45 5.48 -70.9 
45-50 
 
9.68 -63 
50-55 4.38 -73.6 
55-60 4.89 -72.3 
60-65 4.98 -72.1 
≥65 18.57 -51.2 
 
Our intuition is that older people have less bad results simply because they are less active. We 
thus construct a relative activity index defined as the monthly difference between the share with nil 
performance (inactivity, entire portfolio in cash) in the total sample minus that in the age group under 
consideration. A positive (negative) index value refers to relative trading activity (inactivity). 
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   Figure 9: The activity index by age 
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The relatively good performance of older traders obviously comes from their inactivity. 
 
3) IS THERE PERSISTENCE IN RESULTS? 
One classic question regarding trader performance is their ability to persistently enjoy excess 
returns. Intuition suggests that lucky traders will not report persistently good results, while good 
traders will do so: luck is only short-run. There should therefore be a relation between performance 
and autocorrelation: is this the case?  
 
3.1) The distribution of autocorrelation by trader rank 
We examine the link between performance and persistence by ranking traders in 10 mean 
weekly performance deciles. We then test the hypothesis that the autocorrelation distribution (for lags 
comprised between 1 and 12) is the same across deciles. We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
goodness-of-fit test (which is stricter than other tests such as the Chi-square).  
In the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test we have the following hypotheses:  
 
H0: The Empirical Cumulative Distribution Function of the Autocorrelation coefficients by decile 
follows the ECDFA of the entire population. 
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H1: The ECDFA of the decile does not follow the ECDFA of the entire population. 
 
If H0 holds then Table 14 shows the probabilities that the given statistic is drawn. That is, if 
this probability is below 5% we should reject the goodness-of-fit assumption and accept that there is a 
difference between the ECDFA of the given decile relative to the entire population. 
In Table 14, only lag 1 produces a KS test difference for 4 deciles. For the other deciles only the 9
th
 is 
clearly always KS test different.  
      
Table 14: ECDFA Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics for deciles vs. population 
KS stats lag+1 lag+2 lag+3 lag+6 lag+9 lag+12
decile 1 2% 42% 65% 56% 39% 40%
decile 2 51% 18% 17% 13% 74% 82%
decile 3 44% 20% 18% 21% 0% 80%
decile 4 0% 6% 94% 63% 53% 74%
decile 5 36% 96% 67% 6% 19% 32%
decile 6 6% 70% 99% 22% 41% 14%
decile 7 3% 24% 28% 71% 1% 90%
decile 8 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3%
decile 9 55% 16% 64% 70% 68% 34%  
Figure 10 shows the ECDFA (for lags +1) for the various deciles.  
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Figure 10: ECDFA lag +1 for each decile vs mean ECDFA and confidence interval 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
-0.5 0 0.5
0
0.5
1
 
 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
 
The black line in each plot is the ECDFA of each decile (deciles 5 and 6 are merged to make 
the figure less dense). The deciles are increasingly ranked from decile 1 (worst performances) in the 
North-West to decile 10 (best performances) in the South-East. The two blue dotted curves are the 5% 
confidence intervals. The red curve is the entire population ECDF.  Graphically, and in line with the 
previous results, only deciles 4 and 9 are different from the entire population distribution. Decile 4 
ECDFA is closer to the no-autocorrelation distribution, given by the vertical at 0, so there is clearly 
less persistence than in the entire population. The decile 9 ECDFA is rather more negative than that 
for the entire population. This result is unexpected since this decile has better results than average.  
 
This relatively more negative ECDFA suggests the absence of any positive persistence of good 
results among even (relatively) good traders. As such, the previous week's performance has no (or a 
negative) impact on the next week's performance. This absence of persistence suggests the absence of 
skill among traders, even for those who have the best performances. Are the best traders just lucky? 
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3.2) Transition analysis 
The previous test appeals to the autocorrelation between weekly mean returns. Another approach is to 
consider the relative ranks of the competitors. We thus rank traders each month into 10 deciles. We 
then use the date to calculate the transition probability from one decile to another (the Markov 
transition matrix). In each month t, for each decile , the matrix of the frequency  of  the 
transitions of trader i to decile j the next month can be written as: 
 
 
In each month, each  is considered as a random draw. Hence, we construct the statistics 
over the sample of the frequencies for each decile and obtain the matrix  of the mean transition 
frequency and the associated 90% confidence intervals. 
Figure 11: The mean frequencies of transitions from deciles 1 to 10 
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The figure should be read as follows: for the tenth decile, the mean frequency of being in a 
given decile the next month is given by the black line. For instance this is 0.13 for being in the first 
decile, 0.10 in the ninth, and 0.17 in the last. If there were no persistence, the frequency would be 0.1 
for all deciles (the red line), the equi-probability. The two blue dotted lines show the 90% confidence 
intervals. We note that being in the top decile (the winners) in a given period favors being in this 
decile the next period, slightly. However, the associated probability of being in the first three deciles 
(the losers) is also over 10%. Persistence amongst good traders is thus far from being clear.  
 
From another perspective, we have considered the frequency of a trader in a given decile to 
stay in the same decile the following month. This persistence seems to be stronger for losers (over 
25%) than winners (15% in the last 4 deciles). To sum up, in our data, a trader in the first decile has a 
1/7 probability of being in the same decile the following month, whereas a lucky trader has only an 
analogous probability of 1/10.     
 
To evaluate the frequency of being in the same decile during the N next periods (a long-term analysis), 
we use a Monte Carlo method. We simulate the decile paths implied by our Markovian matrix. We 
then compute the implied expected frequency of being in the same decile, with d0 the initial decile and 
T the time horizon: 
) 
 
In Table 15, the expected frequency for every T is close to both the equi-probability of the 
uniform distribution and the ergodic probabilities of the transition matrix. We thus confirm the 
previous finding that decile persistence in the ranking is fairly weak.   
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Table 15: Expected frequency of being in the same decile in the next periods 
deciles 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years 10 years ergodic prob
1 11.85% 11.05% 10.68% 10.50% 10.32% 10.11%
2 11.05% 10.59% 10.55% 10.41% 10.40% 10.32%
3 10.40% 10.45% 10.37% 10.35% 10.32% 10.27%
4 9.46% 9.51% 9.55% 9.52% 9.51% 9.51%
5 9.97% 9.99% 9.85% 9.97% 9.94% 9.88%
6 10.11% 9.79% 9.87% 9.65% 9.63% 9.57%
7 10.36% 9.99% 9.85% 9.85% 9.76% 9.75%
8 10.49% 10.18% 10.06% 10.00% 9.94% 9.87%
9 10.38% 10.15% 10.06% 9.90% 9.86% 9.85%
10 11.37% 11.04% 10.96% 10.90% 10.91% 10.81%  
            
3.3) Is there a stars’ bias? 
The previous analysis has provided only little support for skill-based explanations of trading 
success. This may be the case because there are so few skilled traders that the final decile analysis is 
not restrictive enough. We thus extract the star traders from the data and calculate their transition 
matrix over the 10 deciles
5
 (defined for all competitors):  
 
 
 
Star traders are defined as those who win prizes at least once, twice, or three or more times. 
We present below the mean transition frequencies for each decile. These show the following-month 
decile of star traders. Of course the confidence intervals are now very wide, but the results are 
surprising in that there is no salient difference from the previous decile analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5  The 10 deciles being the same as in the previous calculus. 
29 
 
Figure 12: The mean frequency of transitions from decile 1 to 10 for winners 
 
The long-term analysis is however more supportive of a skill effect: 
 
Figure 13: Probability of staying in the top decile the next month 
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Table 16 : Long-term analysis with ergodic probabilities 
deciles hazard population ≥1 prize ≥2 prizes ≥3 prizes 
1 0.1 0.101 0.114 0.128 0.122 
2 0.1 0.103 0.125 0.130 0.114 
3 0.1 0.103 0.109 0.108 0.011 
4 0.1 0.095 0.104 0.102 0.092 
5 0.1 0.099 0.078 0.083 0.083 
6 0.1 0.096 0.075 0.055 0.060 
7 0.1 0.098 0.062 0.048 0.051 
8 0.1 0.099 0.067 0.054 0.053 
9 0.1 0.099 0.081 0.075 0.076 
10 0.1 0.108 0.184 0.219 0.240 
 
The long-term ergodic probability for the tenth decile thus is clearly different from the equi-
probability, with rapid convergence. We thus find a star effect for prize winners in terms of staying in 
the best decile. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
While 1% of traders are “stars”, who clearly win a great deal relative to the market, more than 
80% of traders lose relative to the market.  
Their relative average annual performance varies from -38% to -60%, depending on the 
method used. In absolute, more than 99% of traders lose and face drastic losses. On average, portfolio 
values fall from an initial value of 100 to a terminal value of 7 in the 29 months covered here. When 
we include the rewards offered by the contest, average performance becomes -13% a year. However, 
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performances remain concentrated since only two deciles continue to beat the market. From an initial 
value of 100 the final value is 28 including rewards, but 95% of traders still lose in absolute. 
There is no clear performance persistence for traders. Are the best traders just lucky then? 
Focusing on contest winners, the long-term transition analysis suggests a long-term probability of 
staying in the best decile which is greater than chance. We thus cannot reject a “star effect” of staying 
in the best decile. However, the great majority of amateurs do seem to be e-pigeons. Online trading 
may just be costly entertainment, like casino gambling.  
 
Our period covers the 2008 crisis and considerable losses may be the consequence of 
undiversified portfolios in a bullish market. This may explain the drastic losses observed relative to 
previous results on amateur traders (Anderson , 2006, Choi, Laibson, Metrick, 2002, Barber, Odean, 
2001(1), Dom, Sengmueller, 2009, Mizrach and Weertz, 2009). More work is therefore warranted to 
better understand the causes of amateur traders' drastically bad performances. 
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